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Abstract
This paper studies the governance institutions and performance consequences of
privatization through management-employee buyout (MEBO) in Romania. Detailed
firm-level survey data are used to analyze ownership rights practices concerning voting,
dividend payment, and sales of shares, and to study the continued role of the state
through restructuring restrictions in the privatization contracts, difficulties in installment
payment, and possible renationalization of shares. Comprehensive privatization and
registry data are used to estimate the productivity performance of industrial MEBOs,
compared with mass transfers to dispersed individuals, sales to domestic and foreign
blockholders, and continued ownership by the state. We find that the ownership structure
of Romanian MEBOs tends to favor employees rather than managers, their institutional
design frequently contains elements of producer cooperatives, they face significant
contractual restrictions on restructuring, and there has been only slight "degeneration" in
ownership in the years since privatization. Estimates of productivity growth equations
imply that MEBOs have clearly out-paced state ownership, while falling short of
blockholder ownership.

*The research reported in this paper was supported by the Phare ACE Programme of the
European Commission. The views expressed in the paper in no way reflect those of the
Commission or of its Services.

1. Introduction

Privatization through transfer or sale to company employees has been among the
most widespread and the most controversial of policy choices in the transition economies.
Only very few governments attempting to transform their economies

from

administratively planned to market-driven have entirely eschewed the use of preferential
privatization to employees. With the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
where few shareholdings were granted to firm employees, most other countries - from
Poland to Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Central Asia, and China - saw employees
becoming company owners on a large scale, particularly at the beginning of the
privatization process.

Even in Hungary, where the predominant method of

denationalization involved sales to blockholder investors, a sizable number of firms had
shares transferred to employees, both in small giveaways and in larger control stakes,
particularly through the use of Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("MRP" in Hungarian).
Its apparent popularity in the region notwithstanding, "insider privatization" has
come in for considerable criticism from outside observers and policy analysts.

The

standard list of complaints includes the alleged incompetence of the existing management
and employees to restructure the firm successfully, the particular difficulty in downsizing
in the presence of excessive employment levels, and the lack of capital for restructuring
exacerbated by agency problems with outside lenders. Many observers have concluded
that privatization to employees will not bring about any improvement - and some that it
may even worsen the firm's situation - relative to continued state ownership. 1 Others
have viewed privatization to employees more positively, emphasizing the possible
incentive effects of worker participation and the advantages of involving "stakeholders"
in the transition process.2
The debate over the desirability of this privatization method has been informed by
only scant empirical evidence, however. Smith, Cin and Vodopivec (1997) is one of the
few systematic studies of the association of employee ownership with firm performance,
although it relies on data (for Slovenia) only through 1992. Frydman et al.'s (1999) study
1 See Lipton and Sachs (1991), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), Black, Kraakman, and Tarrasova (2000),
for example.
2 For instance, Ellerman (1993), Weitzmann (1993), and Stiglitz (2000).

of privatized firms in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary contains very few
employee-owned companies, and the data end in 1993. Studies of Russia, including
Earle and Estrin (1997), have also generally relied on small samples pertaining to a very
short post-privatization period. Furthermore, the literature on privatization to employees
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has tended to pay little attention to the
institutional peculiarities of the employee-owned firms that have come into being in these
countries. Yet economic theory going back to at least Meade (1972) and more recently in
Ben-Ner and Jones (1995), and empirical research on Western forms of employee
ownership and participation (e.g., Conte and Svejnar, 1990; or the review in Bonin,
Jones, and Puttennan, 1993), has emphasized that the behavior of labor-managed firms
will vary with their institutional setup.
This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of employee ownership by
analyzing the institutions and performance consequences of privatization in Romania.
Our approach to understanding the institutional practices relies on a survey we have
conducted of about 100 firms privatized through the method labelled in Romania as
"Management-Employee Buyout." The survey questionnaire was designed to assess the
MEBO-privatized firms' structure and practices concerning the Employees' Organization
and rights of voting, dividend receipt, and tradability of shares; thus it builds on research
by Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) and Earle and Estrin (1996). The survey questionnaire also
elicited information on the extent of continued involvement of the state in the putatively
privatized firms, both through explicit contractual restrictions and on the threat of
renationalization that could follow any failure to meet the schedule of installment
payments to complete the buyout.
With respect to analyzing the productivity impact of employee ownership after
privatization, we use a different database, one that we have constructed from several
sources and that is unusual in enabling us to measure virtually all privatization
transactions concerning the corporatized enterprises during the 1992-98 period in
Romania and to draw inferences concerning employees and other types of acquiring
owners. To compare the impact of owner-types on firm performance, we have linked the
ownership information with panel data containing basic information on industrial firms
for each year from 1992 to 1999.

Thus, unlike previous studies of the impact of

privatization to employees in most countries, we are able to provide estimates based on a
large sample including nearly the entire surviving population of industrial joint-stock
companies eligible for privatization in Romania - 93 percent of such companies in 1999
- and containing longitudinal information data spanning the period from before
privatization took place until well after much of it had occurred.
Our empirical strategy in this estimation follows the broader literature on firm
performance and employee ownership in the choice of the dependent variable and the set
of controlling covariates. We employ a variety of alternative econometric techniques to
control for potential selection bias and measurement error. Subject to the constraints of
the data, which despite their richness concerning the post-privatization ownership
structure are rather limited in financial and operating information, we investigate possible
problems of endogeneity in the determination of the ownership variables.

We also

consider alternative specifications of the functional form through which ownership
affects firm performance, in particular by estimating both linear equations based on
proportionate shareholdings and threshold models of majority privatization and of the
type of the largest owner (a specification commonly adopted in the literature). In the
latter specification, our use of time-invariant group effects controls for pre-privatization
differences in performance and permits an assessment of the magnitude of such
differences.
Section 2 describes the Romanian privatization process and post-privatization
ownership structure, with a focus on the program of Management and Employee
Buyouts. Section 3 presents our analysis of survey data concerning the property rights
practices and relationship with the state for a sample of about 100 firms. Section 4
presents our econometric specifications, and Section 5 reports our estimation findings,
including comparisons with the findings of related studies using similar data and
techniques in other countries. Section 6 concludes, while the detailed description of the
construction of the databases is relegated to an Appendix.

2. Privatization Policies and Ownership Outcomes
This section briefly analyses the Romanian privatization policies and presents our
computations, based on the database we have constructed, of the post-privatization
ownership structure. Our chief purpose is to analyze the implications of the privatization
policies for corporate governance in order to motivate hypotheses concerning the effects
of the policies on firm performance, but the results in this section also represent the first
comprehensive picture of the results of privatization for industrial ownership in Romania.
The section begins by recounting the initial selection of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
for corporatization and eventual privatization, the set of companies that constitutes the
sample analyzed in this paper. We then go on to describe the three major methods of
privatization employed in Romania - management-employee buyout (MEBO), mass
privatization program (MPP), and sales of blocks of shares - and the consequences of
these methods for corporate governance and ownership structure. Throughout we refer to
three alternative perspectives on the ownership structure: the conditional distribution of
ownership by type at the end of 1998 (shown in Table 1), the evolution of the
unconditional mean by owner-type from end-1992 to end-1998 (Table 2), and the
evolution of the incidence of the largest owner-type over the same period (Table 3).3
Corporatization and Residual State Ownership
Similarly to most other transition economies, the process of large and mediumsized enterprise reform in Romania began with corporatization of the SOEs, in order to
make possible their transfer to multiple owners. In Romania the legal conversion took
place relatively quickly, already in 1990, when the SOEs were divided into two groups:
regii autonome and commercial companies. The former group, designated as "strategic,"
was relatively small in number (about 400 companies), although estimates suggest that
the included companies were large (accounting for 47 percent of total SOE assets,
according to Romanian Development Agency, 1997).4
The second group of firms, nearly all of which were reorganized as open jointstock companies, is the focus of attention in this paper. The shares in these corporatized
3 Our ownership data run only through end of 1998, while we have performance information for the firms
in 1999 as well. The data sources and construction are described in the Appendix.

entities were subsequently placed in a newly established State Ownership Fund (SOF)
and one of five Private Ownership Funds (POFs), in a ratio of 70:30 percent. The SOF's
organization and governance resembled those of Ministries of Privatization and State
Property Funds in other transition economies. The POFs, however, were more unusual.
Despite their name, they remained state-governed, their boards of directors appointed by
the Government subject to the approval of both houses of Parliament, and their nominal
owners, approximately 18 million Romanian citizens, without any effective means of
control. Thus, we treat the POFs as a separate category - neither private, nor state - in
the empirical analysis.5
As presented in Table 1, our database contains 2354 industrial firms in SOF
ownership in 1992, when the privatization process began. Most of these (1822 firms, 77
percent of the total) still had some state ownership at the end of 1998, and indeed the
SOF holding, conditional on being present in these firms, was 46.9 percent at the mean
and 50.9 at the median. The unconditional mean, the evolution of which we have
calculated in Table 2, fell from 70 percent at the beginning of 1992 (69.7 at the end of the
year) to 36.3 percent at the end of 1998. As a percentage of firms by largest owner-type,
the SOF share fell from 100 to 47.6 percent, as reported in Table 3. Concerning POF
ownership, 941 firms were partially POF-owned at the end of 1998, with a conditional
mean of 20.1 percent. The POF has almost always been a minority owner, and only 32 of
these firms were majority POF-owned. Starting from the 30 percent handed over to them
in 1991, the POF share declined to 8.0 by the end of 1998 (Table 2); they were never the
largest owner in any but a tiny number of firms (Table 3).
Insert Tables 1-3 about here.
The Romanian Privatization Law of 1991 and associated regulations charged the
SOF with the privatization of all the shares in its portfolio within seven years, although
the Law provided little guidance on how this was supposed to be accomplished,
4 Calculations from the Romanian Enterprise Registry (all registered firms with more than three employees)
provide Further evidence on the large size of the regii: in 1992, their average employment was 2988 (357
firms), compared to an overall Romanian average of 145 (38,833 firms).
5 Earle and Sapatoru (1993 and 1994) describe the legal basis and incentives of the SOF and POFs. In
1996-97, the POFs were converted into funds (known in Romanian as "SIFs"), but their governance
remained nontransparent, each of them having several million small shareholders and rules preventing
ownership concentration, and we shall continue to refer to them as POFs for simplicity. See Negrescu
(2000) for more discussion of the POF/SIFs.

specifying only a very general list of possible methods to be employed. In practice,
however, there have been three fairly specific methods dominating Romanian
privatization: management-employee buyout (MEBO), the mass privatization program
(MPP), and block sales of shares to outside investors. Sales were intended to be the
primary method from the beginning, but the MEBO method already received some
encouragement in the Privatization Law's provision for preferential terms for managers
and employees, which included right of first refusal and installment payments at very low
interest rates, preferences that were expanded and extended in later legislation.6 The
MPP was adopted a bit later, in 1995, as part of attempts to "accelerate" the rate of
property transfer.
The Management-Employee Buyout (MEBO) Method
As discussed in the introduction, privatization through transfers (giveaways or
sales at low prices) to employees have been common but controversial in transition
economies, due to their relative ease of administrative and political implementation, but
they are also frequently alleged to be ill-suited to the restructuring demands of the
transition. On the one hand, insider privatization may improve work incentives, company
loyalty, and support for restructuring, and if ownership is widely dispersed among
employees it may facilitate takeovers by outsiders. On the other hand, employees may
lack the necessary skills, capital, access to markets and technologies necessary to turn
their firms around, and corporate governance by employees may function particularly
poorly when the firm requires difficult restructuring choices involving disparate
distributional impacts within the firm.
While such standard arguments might have some relevance for every form of
employee ownership in the transition economies, the Romanian MEBOs also have some
significant institutional peculiarities. These stem largely from the legal requirement, in
order to obtain the payment preferences, that the employees establish an employees'
association to hold the shares and exercise most ownership rights during the repayment
period of 3-5 years. During this period, the unpaid shares may not be resold, limiting the

6 MEBOs began in earnest in 1993, but a law formalizing the practices was adopted only in 1994; see
Munteanu (1997) for a detailed discussion. After 1996, sales to employees were no longer formally referred
to as "MEBOs," but the institutional arrangements remained the same.

possibility for concentration or takeovers that might improve governance. 7 Moreover, the
Romanian privatization contracts often included restrictions, also valid for the repayment
period, on changes in the firm's employment level and main product. The complicated
governance and limitations on restructuring that resulted from these arrangements may
have further attenuated any potentially positive effects of privatization on these firms'
performance.
Table 1 shows that a total of 858 industrial firms - over a third of all industrial
firms in the SOF portfolio - had undergone MEBO transactions by the end of 1998,
reaching a mean employee stake of 64.9 percent and a median of 70.6 percent. In
addition to the institutional peculiarities discussed above, therefore, insider privatization
in Romania also differs from that in other transition economies in the magnitude of the
insider share in the affected firms. Unlike most share transfers to employees in Hungary
and Poland, and to an even greater degree than in Russia, the Romanian MEBOs tended
to result in overwhelming employee ownership: usually the entire SOF stake of 70
percent, although there were also some cases of minority participation (sometimes
combined together with other methods, mass privatization or a block sale, described
below). 8
Table 2 displays the evolution of ownership over 1992-98. MEBOs were most
common in the years 1994 and 1995, although employees continued to buy out their
companies through 1998, the last year in our ownership data. Second only to the SOF,
MEBO participants were the largest owner-type in 24.5 percent of the firms at the end of
1998, as shown in Table 3.

Measured either as the average percentage of shares

privatized or the largest private owner-type, MEBO has been the single most important
privatization method in Romania.

The MEBOs therefore provide an interesting

opportunity to test the effect of dominant employee ownership in a large number of
privatized firms.
The Mass Privatization Program

1 Anecdotal evidence suggests that voting within the employee association is sometimes according to onemember one-vote rather than by shareholding, suggesting that MEBO firms are hybrid organizations, part
public corporation and part producer cooperative.
See Earle and Estrin (1996) for a comparative discussion. The fraction obtained by insiders in Romanian
MEBOs was frequently 100 percent, as the POFs often sold their shares simultaneously with the SOF.

A second major method was mass or voucher privatization. As elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, the rationale for this method was to increase the speed of privatization by
overcoming the problems of insufficient demand due to low domestic savings and
reluctance of foreign investors (e.g., Earle, Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1993; Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The programs, frequently labeled "mass privatization," were
also intended to jump-start domestic equity markets with a rapid release of shares. On
the other hand, such programs run the risk of highly dispersed ownership structures, a
problem normally addressed through the creation of intermediaries - either by the state as
part of the program (e.g., in Poland), or by private parties competing for individuals'
vouchers (e.g., in Czechoslovakia).

Although there has been rather little empirical

evidence on the effects of these programs, a number of authors have been highly critical
of them.9
The Romanian mass privatization program (MPP), carried out in 1995-96,
provides an opportunity to estimate the effects of a rather extreme form of voucher
privatization:

one that ensured maximal dispersion of ownership by prohibiting the

trading of vouchers and the formation of intermediaries. The potential benefits of the
program may also have been reduced by the large stake kept by the state: in most
companies included in the program, only 60 percent of the shares were offered, while in
those deemed "strategic" (which tended to be relatively large firms) the figure was only
49 percent. Even these percentages were reached in very few companies, due to the
peculiar asymmetry of the treatment of excess demand and excess supply by the
allocation procedure:

oversubscription resulted in pro rata

allocation, while

undersubscription resulted in untransferred shares. 10 As Table 1 shows, a total of 1727
industrial firms were included in the program, with a mean of 24.5 percent and a median
of 18.4 percent privatized; only about one-sixth of the firms in the program were majority
privatized.
The consequence was inevitably an ownership structure heavily dominated by the
state (often retaining the majority stake) facing a highly dispersed group of private
owners. Any hope for a positive impact of this program would seem to rely on an

9 See, e.g., Stiglitz (1999), Black, Kraakman and Tarrassova (2000), Kornai (2000), and Roland (2000).
10 Earle and Telegdy (1998) report details of the MPP procedures.

indirect mechanism:

either through secondary sales leading to increased private

ownership concentration, through share trading increasing information about firm
performance and therefore managerial incentives, 11 or through some complementarity
with other owners, particularly blockholders that purchased shares through a direct sale.
In such cases, the MPP may still have had a positive effect, despite its design.
Shares in the MPP were taken both from the SOF and the five POFs, but the latter
could regain some shares if citizen-participants in the MPP exercised their option to place
their vouchers with one of them. On average, by the program's design, the POFs were net
losers from this procedure: as shown in Table 2, their mean share dropped from 23.8
percent at the end of 1995 to 9.2 percent a year later.

Both before the MPP and

subsequently, the POFs have also sold shares from their portfolios, resulting in a
reduction of their stake to only 8.1 percent by the end of 1998. Frequently, such sales
were organized in conjunction with SOF privatization sales.
Privatization through Sales to Outsiders
The third major class of privatization method employed in Romania has involved
case-by-case sales of large blocks of shares to outside investors. The most important type
of sales method has been closed-bid tender, in which not only the offered price but also
the business plan, investment and employment promises, and other considerations are
taken into account by the SOF in selecting the buyer. These considerations are then
frequently reflected in provisions of the privatization contract that restrict postprivatization behavior, as in the MEBO privatizations (Negrescu, 2000). Although the
Romanian policymakers may feel themselves politically constrained to ensure continued
employment and operation of the firms, such restrictions could have reduced
restructuring in the companies privatized through block sales, reducing the potential
benefits of privatization. 12
Moreover, the sales method has a number of intrinsic problems that tend to make
it slow and uncertain. First, multi-criteria tenders naturally involve a lack of transparency
in the process, as there are no announced or pre-determined weights for the various

11 After the MPP, the companies were listed on either the Bucharest Stock Exchange or RASDAQ (the
Romanian over-the-counter market).
12 Unfortunately, our database does not permit us to measure these restrictions for each company
separately.

aspects of the bid and potential participants are left guessing as to the tradeoffs among
them. The bids are not publicly revealed after the tender either, making it difficult to
monitor the SOF's decisions.

Because of the lack of an objective criterion and the

nontransparency of the process, the selection decision can be easily manipulated, creating
the appearance, if not always the reality, of corruption. Indeed, even a perfectly clean
process organized by perfectly honest, well-intentioned bureaucrats can be hijacked by
corruption charges, as there is little defense against charges of favoritism. Opposition
parties are quick to exploit the possibility to score points against the government, and the
bureaucrats, fearing charges of corruption and with few incentives to privatize
aggressively, tend to act very cautiously. Of course, the problems are magnified to the
extent that the bureaucrats are less than perfect and act as rent-seekers by seeking bribes
in the privatization process and colluding with the enterprise managers to strip assets
before privatization.

Political battles may also erupt over the fulfillment of the

contractual restrictions, resulting in the canceling of privatization contracts, effectively in
renationalization. 13 The cumulative effect is to further reduce demand and make sales
more difficult as potential investors become still more reluctant to participate in the
uncertain environment.
These difficulties are reflected in the pace of privatization through sales, which
has been slow, similar to the experience of most other transition economies, although the
Romanian privatization policy specified them as the primary method from the very
beginning of the process in 1991. 14 Nonetheless, the data contain a sufficient number of
observations on sales for us to be able to evaluate their impact on firm performance. As
shown in Table 1, 476 firms underwent large blocks sales by the end of 1998 (378 to
domestic investors and 98 to foreigners). Most of these blocks were quite large: an
average of 52.7 and 56.6 percent to domestic and foreign investors, respectively (42.3
and 51.0 at the median). Concerning majority ownership, 245 firms had either domestic
or foreign investors in the majority, while one or the other type was the largest type (not
necessarily majority) in 12.6 percent of the firms (Table 3); most of these were domestic
13 Our database shows that annulments of transactions are much more common for sales than for MEBOs,
and non-existent for MPP transfers.
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owners (9.3 percent), and foreign investors were dominant in only 3.3 percent of the
firms.
To summarize our analysis of ownership results, by the end of 1998 the state's
share in the corporatized industrial companies had fallen to 36.3 percent on average.
Most of the companies with private ownership became majority private.

The most

prevalent types of new owners were employees (23.6 percent on average) obtaining
shares through MEBOs. Second came the participants of the Mass Privatization Program
(18.2 percent on average), who may also have included employees.

Concentrated

outsiders - domestic and foreign - were present in 476 (20 percent) of the companies, but
again the average in this group of firms was a majority stake. In more than three-quarters
of all firms, the SOF retained some ownership stake; within this group, the average state
share was quite high, at 46.9 percent. The heterogeneity of the Romanian privatization
methods thus produced an interesting testing ground for examining the impact of
alternative ownership structures on firm performance.
At the same time, our analysis has also highlighted reasons why privatization may
have had little or no effect in Romania, or at least had fewer benefits than if it had been
optimally designed.

Each of the privatization methods created possible corporate

governance problems (insider control, dispersion of shareholdings, contractual
restrictions) that might have blocked or reduced the new owners' incentives to restructure
and raise productivity. An additional factor that could have weakened the impact of
privatization, sometimes cited in studies of privatization in other transition economies, is
the general business environment: if property rights are not respected and enforcement of
contracts and corporate governance rules is poor, then the new owners may expect little
return from their investments and restructuring efforts. 15 The business environment in
Romania has come in for frequent criticism, for instance in the EBRD's regular grading
of transition economies according to their "institutional performance." EBRD (2000, p.
21) awarded Romania a score only slightly ahead of Russia and well behind Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic, although none of the economies were considered to
14 Eastern Germany, Hungary and Estonia, each of which had clear advantages in selling to outsiders, are
partial exceptions to the generally slow rate of privatization through sales in transition economies, although
the pace was criticized even in these three countries.
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have reached "a standard that would not look out of place in an industrialized market
economy" (p. 16). Regardless of the exact rankings, our point is that it is not a foregone
conclusion that privatization under such conditions, even sales to foreign investors,
would yield substantial benefits: the question can only be decided through empirical
analysis.

This point should be borne in mind when we discuss our econometric

comparisons of MEBO-privatized firms with other ownership forms below.
3. Inside the Insider-Controlled Firm

The previous section reported on the post-privatization ownership structure of
Romanian firms, including the fraction of shares transferred to employees through
MEBOs, but data limitations prevented it from a deeper analysis of the distribution of
shares among managers and workers of various types.

Nor were we, with the

comprehensive data, able to describe the institutional framework for employee ownership
in Romania, the ways property rights and governance and exercised in practice. To
address these issues, this section reports our analysis of survey data for 100 firms that
<
were privatized by the MEBO method in the early years of transition, 1993 or 1994. 16
Our main purpose is to understand aspects of these firms' governance that may shed light
on the effectiveness of employee ownership in dealing with the complex restructuring
problems of economic transition. These aspects include the employees' organization, or
PAS, and how voting, trading, and cash flow rights are exercised. They also include the
role of the state, particularly restrictions in the privatization contract on changes in the
level of employment and main activity of the firms. A further restriction concerned the
sale of shares, which if it occurred at a higher price than the heavily subsidized price at
which insiders could buy the firm's shares, the difference between the two prices was
supposed to be paid back to the state.

The speed at which employee-owned firms

"degenerate," or convert themselves into conventional outside-owned organizations, has
been one of the biggest controversies in the transition (Aghion and Blanchard, 1996,
provide a formal analysis), and the sales restriction might be expected to reduce the rate
of such conversions. Here again, however, empirical evidence has been lacking. Our
See Anderson et al (1999) for this argument with respect to Mongolia. Black et al (2000) argue that the
lack of institutional development in Russia has led to asset-stripping post-privatization.
16 The main features of the survey are described in the Appendix.
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data permit us to provide some evidence for the Romanian case through information on
changes in the ownership structure of MEBO firms in our sample, results that are
presented toward the end of this section.
Table 4 displays the 1995 ownership structure of the sample firms, including the
distribution for each type of shareholder.

Unlike other countries, where insider

privatization involved only part of the shares, sometimes only a minority total
shareholding, the MEBO firms were overwhelmingly dominated by employees:

on

average, they owned 94.8 percent of the firms, and the minimum holding was over 50
percent and the tenth percentile was 85.4. As a consequence, outsider shareholders had
very small ownership stakes, on average owning only 4.6 percent of the shares. The
survey questionnaire raised the possibility that not even all of these shareholders are
genuine outsiders by inquiring whether any of them were former employees of the firm
who had obtained their shares through the MEBO privatization. It turns out that, among
the owners who were not current employees, retirees had 0.8 percent of the shares, while
other former employees 1 percent. The maximum holdings of these two types of former
employees were only 6.8 and 13 percent, respectively, and only a minority of the firms
had such owners.

Outside investors who were neither current nor former employee

owners held 2.8 percent ownership on average and this type of ownership is even less
prevalent: the 75th percentile was still zero. The other major type of owner, the state had
almost no ownership in these firms.
The survey questionnaire also permits a number of types of employeeshareholders to be distinguished. On average, managers of these firms owned 30.9
percent of the shares in 1995. But the extent of managerial ownership varied widely:
from a minimum holding of 2 percent to a maximum of 81.4. Non-managerial employees
owned approximately twice as much on average as did managers (62.7 percent), although
the magnitude also varied, from 8.9 percent to almost 100 percent. While over 60
percent of firms were majority-owned by non-managerial employees, only about 20
percent were majority-managerially owned.
The survey also requested separate information on the holdings of non-production
and production workers, and of skilled and unskilled workers among the latter. The
average holdings of production and non-production were quite similar in 1995, both

13

categories owning around one-third of the firm's shares. Among production workers, it
turned out that there were few workers classified as unskilled in the sample firms, skilled
workers were reported to own 31.9 percent while unskilled had only 2.9 percent on
average. The similar holdings of production workers and skilled workers show, that few
workers are classified as unskilled workers. Finally, there are some shares remaining
with the PAS, not owned by any individual: 1.2 percent on average.
Insert Table 4 about here
The results from similar calculations for the holdings of various owner-types, but
conditioned on positive shareholding, are shown in Table 5.

Significant differences

concern only the categories of unskilled workers, PAS, and outside owners. Unskilled
workers were owners in 59 companies, and their average shareholding was 4.4 percent
and on the median they owned 2 percent of the firm's shares. This shows that the
ownership stake of unskilled workers was small but unevenly distributed among firms:
while in most of the firms it was zero, in one firm they owned 45 percent of the shares.
Shares held by the PAS existed in only six companies, but in these the PAS' proportion
was 18.1 percent on average. The conditional ownership table is most informative for
outside owners, who were present in only a part of the companies and thus the
conditional and unconditional statistics differ significantly. Former employees of the
company who retired owned shares in 39 firms (43.5 percent of the total number of
firms), with a small percent: 1.8 percent on average, and 6.8 percent at the maximum.
Other former employees held larger ownership stakes (3.9 percent on average and 13
percent at the maximum).

Outside investors were present in only 20 companies,

suggesting much higher ownership conditional on ownership than implied by the
unconditional statistics, but their holding was still only 12.9 percent of the shares at the
mean, and 6.0 at the median, in those 20 companies.

In no case did outside investors

have a majority of the shares. Finally, our data suggest that the state did not keep
dominant control in firms that underwent an early MEBO privatization. For our sample,
the state continued to be an owner in only 2 firms, in one holding 10 percent through a
POP, and in the other 44 percent through the SOF.
Insert Table 5 about here
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Our analysis of ownership structure has shown that employee ownership
dominates every MEBO firm, although the particular type of employee accounting for
most of the shares varies across firms. But how are these shareholdings connected with
influence over the firm's behavior? Besides the voting rights themselves, the key to
understanding corporate governance in the MEBO-privatized firms is the PAS, the
organization which carries through the negotiation with the SOF and POP, determines the
distribution of shares, assumes the responsibility for the repayment of the loan which
financed the purchase, and exercises voting rights for the shares under its control (which
may be defined different across firms). The legislation did not determine even the
principles of distribution of shares, leaving substantial variation across firms in the
division of voting rights between individual employees and the PAS.

Table 6

summarizes our results for 1995: 58.5 percent of the shares were voted individually, and
36.3 by the PAS. Managers had a slightly greater tendency to be able to vote their shares
individually, as they accounted for 20 percent of the shares on average, and nonmanagerial employees for 38.6 percent. The table also shows the holdings of nonproduction and production workers, and skilled-unskilled workers, as the previous two
tables. Except for unskilled workers, the other types of insiders voted individually at
least some of the shares in about 70 percent of the firms. The percentiles show that
individual voting rights tended to be clustered: the 25th percentile was zero, and on the
median the groups of insiders voted for 12 - 13 percent of the shares, with the exception
of the large group of non-production workers, who had over 30 percent of voting rights
on the median. However, the 75th percentile was already around 30 percent of each
owner-type, the exception being the unskilled workers again.
The PAS voted for 36.3 percent of the shares on average and 0 on the median,
showing that its voting power tended to be bi-modal at the extremes. Indeed, the PAS
voting share, conditional on it being positive, was 78.7 percent at the mean and 93.8
percent at the median. Thus, a large fraction of the 45.7 percent of the companies in
which the PAS had positive voting power were dominated by this organization, or the
members of the PAS who can control it. The distribution of shares (and voting rights)
within the PAS was similar to overall shareholdings, which may be caused by the even
distribution of the subscribed shares across PAS and non-PAS: as the credit is repaid,
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each group receives the shares proportionally to their subscriptions, at least in many
companies. The only visible difference between individual voting rights and within-PAS
voting rights is that in the latter voting rights were even more concentrated in dominant
types: at the median all types owned nothing, but holdings above the 75th percentile are
quite large.
All the MEBO-privatized firms are formally organized as joint-stock companies,
with voting in the general shareholders' meeting according to one share

one vote. But

the law did not prescribe this rule, or any particular rule, for voting within the PAS, an
important issue since the board of directors of the PAS is elected by its members, rather
than being appointed as in a conventional ESOP. As discussed above, the PAS itself
exercised voting rights for many shares, thus the PAS board could in effect determine
how all PAS shares would be voted at the general meeting. With this motivation, our
survey questionnaire asked about the voting system used for PAS decision-making.
Table 7 shows that two voting structures existed: one member - one vote system at 43.6
percent of the companies, while the rest used voting rights according to the subscribed
shares. The practice of one voting right per member is a central feature of the producer
cooperative, as described by Benin, Jones, and Putterman (1993), and our survey shows
that around half the MEBO firms share this characteristic.
Insert Table 7 about here

Furthermore, the PAS also appears to have had control over the tradability of
shares. Outsiders have been completely excluded from acquiring shares still held in the
PAS, and even transactions among insiders have required PAS approval; with respect to
shares outside the PAS, the situation is less clear.

The restrictions on tradability

(exacerbated by state policy requiring any profits on share sales to be paid to the SOF)
are also common in producer cooperatives, and in closed joint stock, limited liability, and
other privately held firms. Thus, the configurations of ownership rights in MEBO firms
place their institutional form somewhere in the space between traditional producer
cooperatives, majority ESOP firms, managerial buyouts (MBOs) and open joint stock
companies, with the precise point in the space varying across firms. As the firms share
some of the characteristics of each of these organizational forms, their behavior is likely
to represent composite influences, a weighted average of the behaviors that would be
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exhibited by each of the ideal types, with the weights determined by ownership structure
and institutional practices.
The firms closest to the producer cooperative form would be those in which the
PAS had a majority of shares and voting is according to one member - one vote. Out of
the 91 firms in our sample for which we have complete ownership information, 18 are in
this category (19.8 percent).

The firms closest to MBOs would be those in which

managers directly possessed more shares than either non-managerial employees and the
PAS, or if within the PAS members vote according to their holdings and the total holding
of managers (that is, individual holdings and holding within the PAS) are greater than
non-managerial holdings. 17 According to this classification, there are 18 MBOs in the
sample (19.8 percent). Other types are closer to majority ESOP or open joint stock
companies, depending on the size of the PAS; there are 55 firms are in this residual
category (60.4 percent).
Our survey also collected information on the concentration of share ownership by
type of owner, motivated by potential problems of collective action within homogeneous
groups and of conflict where some heterogeneity of interest exists.
concentration of shares in two ways.

10

We measure

Table 8 and 9 present two measures of

concentration: the percentage of shares owned per person within each owner-type and
the percentage of shares owned by each of the four managers and non-managerial
employees owning the most shares, respectively.
Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here

Shares per capita varied widely among types of shareholders. Among insiders,
there was some correlation between the position in the company and the shares per
person. Managers voted individually for 6.3 percent of shares on average, followed by
non-production workers at 1.9 percent and production workers at 0.7 percent. Skilled
workers voted 0.7 percent on average, while unskilled workers' average was only 0.4
percent. Within the PAS a similar structure can be observed. Perhaps most striking is the

17 The underlying assumption here is that if in the PAS members vote according to the subscribed shares,
their voting power is actually the sum of their shares, since they may support the same position in both
meetings (PAS and the general meeting of shareholders). This assumption may be wrong if the voting
structure follows a pyramid, with a group dominating the PAS having a minority overall.
18 Hansmann (1990) discusses the costs of reaching an agreement.
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average shareholding of outside investors. On average, they own only 5.5 percent of the
shares, and the median value is only 1.2 percent.
Turning to the four-owner concentration measure, the aggregate holding of the
four managers with the largest ownership stake, shown in Table 9 is rather high, 28.1
percent on average. Although non-managerial employees as a group owned much more,
the same figure for them is only 11 percent. At the median, managers owned 21 percent,
and the maximum value was 84 percent, which shows that there were firms clearly
dominated by the managers. The four largest non-managerial employee-owners never
had a majority of the shares, their maximum aggregate holding being only 42 percent.
Although the state did not keep a large ownership stake in the MEBO firms, the
privatization contract contained restrictions concerning change in the level of
employment, the main activity of the firm and sale of assets. Table 10 shows that almost
all firms had such restrictions and that they were imposed for substantial lengths of time:
the average firm was not permitted to change the level of employment for 2.1 years, the
to change the major activity for 4.9 years, and to sell assets for 5.5 years. The maximum
value of the length of restrictions show that there were firms which were restricted for 8 10 years. The last column shows that out of the 66 firms for which we have data in 1998,
6-7 percent still had restrictions.
Insert Table 10 about here
A final issue we take up in this brief introduction to our survey results is the
controversy over the speed of "degeneration" of ownership: how fast outsiders will buy
up the firm? The last two tables presented in this section show the ownership structure of
a subsample of the firms presented so far, the voting rights of insiders and the changes in
the ownership structure between 1995 and end of 1998. Table 11 shows the ownership
structure of 69 firms for which we have this information. Insiders still held the vast
majority of shares: on average, they held 87.5 percent, and at the median 100 percent.
Managers and non-managerial employees had 29.2 and 58.5 percent on average,
respectively.

Although insiders clearly dominate most of the firm, some outsider

ownership penetrated the MEBO firms: 33.3 percent of the firms had some outsider
ownership by 1998. For the whole sample, outsiders owned 12.2 percent of the firms'
shares. Domestic individuals were the most prevalent type, present in 20.3 percent of the
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firms, but usually with holdings under 50 percent.

Domestic firms, foreigners and

POF/SIFs were present in 6 - 9 percent of the companies only, the first two having rather
large average holdings, while the latter owned only a trivial fraction of the shares. The
state owned small shareholdings in 4 companies.
Insert Table 11 about here
Table 12 presents the ownership structure of the same sample of firms for 1995
and 1998. The tendency in these 62 firms was for a decline in employee ownership and a
rise in outside ownership, but on average the changes are not very dramatic. From an
average value of 94.5, insiders holdings fell only 7.3 percent, reaching 87.2 percent at the
end of 1998. The PAS (which was maintained in 18 companies, out of 64), lost much of
its voting: from 36.1 percent in 1995 it decreased approximately by half, to 18.6 percent.
The voting system of the PAS also changed: only 2 organizations use a one-member
one-vote procedure. As the PAS paid back its loan and distributed the company's shares
to subscribers, both managers and non-managerial employees increased individual
holdings, and decreased their holdings within the PAS.

This process is particularly

dramatic in the case of managers, who decreased their PAS holdings from 11.7 to 2.8
percent. Outsiders increased their holding by more than half, from 5.4 to 12.6 percent on
average.
Insert Table 12 about here
By 1998, therefore, the character of the MEBO-privatized firms in our sample had
shifted somewhat.

Out of the 69 firms for which we have complete ownership

information, none were still producer cooperatives.

18 were dominated by their

managers (26.1 percent), 43 by the non-managerial employees (62.3 percent), and 7 are
outsider-dominated (10.4 percent). In one firm workers and managers have the same
holdings and this holding is larger than the percent of shares owned by outsiders. If the
results for our sample are representative of the population of firms initially bought out by
their employees, it suggests that nearly all of them remained employee-dominated, even
several years after their privatization. And although the producer cooperative element
had diminished, as had the role of the state

at least in terms of formal contractual

restrictions, these elements were quite strong in the earlier post-privatization years. How
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these considerations affected the performance of these companies is an empirical
question, one to which we turn in the next section.

4. Empirical Specification

The central question of this paper concerns the effects of privatization through
management-employee buyout, relative to alternative methods of privatization and to
continued state ownership, on firm performance,

hi this section, we describe the

econometric approach we employ to estimate these effects, beginning with a discussion
of our measure of firm performance, the dependent variable in our analysis. Second, we
present our specifications of ownership structure - our independent variables of interest and of the control variables we include in the equations to help us identify the ownership
effects. The specification of ownership structure is motivated by our earlier discussion of
Romanian privatization methods, while our selection of control variables follows the
standard literature on the privatization-performance relationship. The final part of this
section describes the set of alternative estimation methods we employ to control for
measurement error, unobserved heterogeneity and possible selection bias in the
ownership data generating process. Each technique has advantages, and our approach
therefore is to employ a range of methods in order to assess the robustness of the
findings. The results from the estimations are reported in Section 5, below, while our
sources and construction of the database are described in the Appendix.
Our empirical strategy follows the literature in estimating reduced form equations
for firm performance as a function of ownership, while trying to account for potential
problems of heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) and simultaneity bias. 19 Using a
model for panel data, in which i indexes firms and t indexes time periods (years), we
estimate equations of the following form:
Pa = fr + frOWNit + j32Xit + uu,

(1)

where P// is a measure of firm performance, OWNu captures ownership (sometimes as a
vector of variables), Xit is a vector of covariates, and uit is a residual.

19 See the surveys by Djankov and Murrell (2000) and Megginson and Netter (2001).
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A first estimation issue concerns the measurement of firm performance. In this
paper, we analyze labor productivity growth, a dependent variable employed in much of
the prior research on firm performance. 20 While it would be desirable to examine other
performance indicators, such as profitability, Tobin's "Q" or total factor productivity
(TFP), the available data unfortunately do not permit us to measure these variables.
Indeed, while our data on the privatization process are quite rich and detailed, the only
other available information on firms is limited to their employment and revenue in the
years 1992-99, as well as their industry and region. Without a measure of the capital
'

___

stock or other inputs, we cannot estimate TFP.

*j *

While TFP would provide a more

encompassing measure of productive efficiency, labor productivity has the advantage that
it reflects changes in the capital stock due to investment, which may itself demonstrate
superior performance in the poorly functioning capital market environment of Eastern
Europe.
On the other hand, labor productivity may be influenced by unmeasured variables
such as capital, material inputs, and technology. Therefore, we specify the dependent
variable as labor productivity growth, which differences away any fixed firm-specific
characteristics that affect the level of labor productivity. As discussed below, we also
control for industry, size, and the lagged level of labor productivity to take into account
other differences across firms such as capital-labor ratios; in some specifications we also
include fixed firm effects or group effects (for ownership types).
Table 13 shows summary statistics for the levels of average employment, real
value of sales (in thousand 1992 lei), and labor productivity. According to the data,
average employment in industrial enterprises dropped every year by 8-17 percent, except
for 1996, when the fall was around 4 percent. Over the whole period, the cumulative
drop was 55.7 percent on average.

The real value of sales and labor productivity

displayed much more volatile patterns, rising in some years and falling in others.
Insert Table 13 about here.
20 Studies using labor productivity level or growth as the dependent variable include Anderson et al (2000),
Boubakri and Cosset'(1998), Carlin et al (2001), Claessens and Djankov (1999a,b), Djankov (1999b,c),
D'Souza and Megginson (1999), Earle (1998), Earle and Estrin (1997), Frydman et al (1999), Megginson et
al (1994), Pohl et al (1997), and Weiss and Nikitin (1998).
21 Anderson et al (2000), Claessens et al (1997), Piesse and Thirtle (2000), and Smith et al (1997) estimate
total factor productivity functions.
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Next we turn to our specification of the ownership structure, OWNlt.

The

literature on privatization together with our analysis of the Romanian privatization
programs in Sections 2 and 3 suggest several alternative ways of specifying the
ownership variables. A first approach is based on the proportion of shares in private
ownership of various types. 22 As discussed above, our data permit us to distinguish
insiders, mass privatization participants, and domestic and foreign investors who
purchase blocks of shares; another category represents unidentifiable "other" owners in
the database who could not be identified, but who have very small shareholdings. An
alternative specification involves a threshold or critical level of ownership, below and
above which an increase in shareholding has zero marginal impact; here this threshold is
defined as the largest type of owner.23
Turning to the control variables, XH, we are interested in accounting for
heterogeneity in performance, Pu9 that may also be correlated with our variables of
interest, OWNu. A first problem involves mismeasurement in labor productivity arising if
firms differ systematically with respect to their production functions and levels of
investment, and capital-labor ratios.

This suggests that industry effects (we specify 14

categories) and firm size (a proxy for capital intensity) should be included; we measure
size as employment, lagged to avoid endogeneity problems. Firms may also differ in
their set-up costs, quality of equipment, and technology. Again these are likely to be
correlated with industry and size, and we also include the lagged level of labor
productivity in Xu, and in some specifications firm-specific fixed effects.24
A second problem involves initial conditions and the magnitude of the demand
shock faced by the firm, as the state cut its orders drastically and customer and supply
chains broke down (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). A firm with better initial conditions
may have been more cushioned from the impact of competition, while a greater shock
suggests that firms may have greater difficulty adjusting and maintaining productivity.
22 All the firms in the SOF portfolio, and therefore in our database, are share companies.
23 This specification is similar to that estimated by Frydman et al (1999), and it differs from the "dominant
ownership" approach of Earle and Estrin (1997) and others, which requires that the "dominant"
shareholding exceed some minimum (e.g., 40 percent).
24 The lagged level of productivity is frequently included in productivity and productivity growth equations
(e.g., Anderson et al, 2000; Earle, 1998; Frydman et al, 1999). Another argument for controlling for it is
the possibility that it is more difficult, other things equal, to increase productivity if it is already high than if
it is low.
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We hypothesize that firms facing a greater demand shock will have more difficulty
maintaining productive efficiency, due to the costs of laying off workers, unbundling
equipment and other capital, etc. These shocks may be correlated with industry and
region, and they likely vary across years. We include year, industry, and region (6
categories) effects under the assumption that these may be correlated with unobserved
shocks to a firm's productivity; and it is frequently argued that larger firms face more
difficult adjustments, thus lagged employment is useful here as well. The region effects
also may reflect market conditions in a firm's environment: particularly for declining
firms, maintaining productivity may be easier when the industry and region is growing,
facilitating the release of workers and capital to other firms. Finally, the region effects
may also account for differences in relative input prices that could lead to different
allocation of factors of production within firms.
These conceptual arguments suggest that such characteristics as industry, region,
size, and year may be correlated with firm performance. But these variables may well be
related to ownership as well, due to patterns of both the shares offered by the SOF and
the demands of various types of new owners. To examine whether such relationships are
statistically significant in our data, we regressed our share ownership variables
(percentage private and percentage held by largest private owner-type in alternative
specifications) on groups of industry, region, size-category and year dummies. Each
group of dummies was jointly significant in every equation, nearly always at the 1
percent significance level, suggesting the importance of including them as controls.

*7 *\

With these specifications of the dependent variable, the post-privatization
ownership, and the controls, the basic estimating equation is
Log (Si(/Ejt}-Log (Sit-i/Elt-i) = PO + pnForeignShareit + j3i2DomesticShareit
+ pi3MEBOShareit + /3J4MassShareit + p]5OtherShareit + /316POFShareit

uih

(2)

25 The coefficients from these equations reflect both the supply-side considerations of SOF offerings and
the patterns of demand by potential new owners, with higher rates of privatization in the food, printing and
publishing, furniture, footware, textile, and other sectors of light industry, and low rates of privatization in
heavy industrial sectors such as mining, wood, chemicals, metallurgy, and machine building.

23

where SH is sales of firm i in year /, EU is the corresponding employment, YEARt represent
year effects (/ = 1993,...,1999), /M),7 are industry effects (/' = 1 ,-,14), REGik are region
effects (k = 1,...6), the ft are parameters to be estimated, uit reflects unmeasured factors,
and the sum of the share variables plus the state shareholding equals one.
Even with such controls, it is possible that there is still some unmeasured
heterogeneity correlated both with ownership and performance.

To take this into

account, we estimate some models including firm fixed-effects, so that the estimating
equation is the following:
Log (Sit/Eit)-ljOg (Sit-i/Eit-i) = Pi + PuForeignShareit + PnDomesticShareit
14MassShareu + Pi5OtherShareit + /316POFShareit
+ #Log£*.y + Xt-iflYEAR, + uih

(3)

where pi is a vector of firm fixed effects.
In these models, the estimates of /?// to p^ reflect the effects of the "within-firm"
variation of ownership by permitting each firm to have a separate intercept. Thus, any
systematic variation across firms in the rate of its labor productivity growth will not
contaminate the parameter estimates. The firm fixed effects also help to control for
possible endogeneity of ownership, resulting for instance from any tendency for firms
with higher productivity growth to be privatized. As long as the unobserved component
of productivity growth associated with the privatization propensity is fixed over time,
then the inclusion of firm effects completely controls for selection bias.
We also estimate analogous equations with dummies representing largest nonstate

owner

(ForeignDummy,

OtherDummy, and POFDummy).

DomesticDwnmy,

MEBODummy,

MassDummy,

In these models, we include group effects in the

equations, so that the estimating equation is:
Log (Sit/Eit)-Log (Sit-i/Eit-i) = YO + YoiForeignEveri + ^DomesticEveri + ^
i + yosOtherEveri + yoaPOFEveri
Yi2DomesticDummyit + y/3MEBODummyi
+ Yi4MassDummyit + YisOtherDummyu +
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where the group effects (ForeignEver^ etc.) are constant over time, the y are parameters
to be estimated and vit represent the residuals associated with this specification of
ownership.

This method imposes a stronger restriction than the firm fixed-effects

specification, but also has the advantage of permitting some inferences to be drawn
concerning the pre-privatization performance of firms subsequently privatized.

For

instance, in equation (4) above, yos represents the difference between the labor
productivity growth of firms that have not yet been but will be MEBO-privatized in the
future and that of firms that are never MEBO-privatized (within our sample period); if
better performing firms tend to be sold to their employees, then yos should be positive.
7/3, on the other hand, represents the post-privatization change in labor productivity
growth relative to the pre-privatization growth rate of firms that are eventually observed
to be MEBO-privatized; if MEBO privatization is pure selection (on time-invariant
criteria), then -yn should be zero. More generally, the parameters Oft/, »?W) represent the
labor productivity performance of the firm prior to its acquisition by the given ownertype, relative to firms remaining in state ownership. The group effects may be interpreted
as estimates of the selection bias into each ownership category, while the coefficients on
the largest owner dummies (yji,...,yi6) reflect the change in performance associated with
ownership change.
Our efforts to control for selection bias notwithstanding, a residual possibility
concerns some dynamic selection mechanism whereby firms with greater possibilities for
raising productivity growth have greater or smaller probabilities of being privatized and
of being acquired by different types of private owners. Such a selection mechanism
could arise, for instance, if there is some characteristic of firms, their "quality," that is
observable to buyers or to the SOF, but not to the researcher. Note that this characteristic
can relate neither to the level of firm performance (e.g., labor productivity) nor to the
growth of performance (e.g., labor productivity growth), as our use of fixed firm effects
in growth equations would eliminate the impact of such a characteristic. Rather, the
characteristic would have to involve an ability to accelerate productivity, and it would
have to be independent of all of our control variables.

Such selection may seem

implausible, but it would be desirable to check for it if data were available to instrument
changes in the ownership structure.

Instruments would need to be correlated with
25

ownership change but not with labor productivity growth, a tall order. Unfortunately, our
analysis uses all the variables in our database, and we have no appropriate instruments for
such an investigation.

This problem faces all studies of privatization and firm

performance, of course, including studies that treat selection bias through fixed effects,
and the possibility of such a dynamic selection mechanism should be borne in mind in
interpreting results.26
A final issue concerns measurement error.

Although we have carefully

constructed and cleaned our data, some significant outliers remain, and we cannot be sure
whether these represent true differences across firms or simply noise associated with
most large firm-level databases.

Moreover, the fixed effects procedure we employ in

some specifications is especially sensitive to measurement error, as within-firm estimates
may exacerbate the noise to signal ratio. For this reasons, and to establish the robustness
of our results, we estimate all equations using both ordinary least squares and least
absolute deviations, or median regression. This latter procedure puts equal weight on all
observations regardless of how far they lie from the regression line; large outliers do not
influence the estimates as they would using OLS.
5. Empirical Results

We examine the association between ownership and productivity growth starting
with simple descriptive statistics and tests of differences of means across ownership
categories, and then moving on to the estimates of the regression equations specified in
the previous section. Table 14 provides the first results, showing the mean productivity
growth of firm-years grouped according to the dominant owner of the firm, using the
categories defined in the previous section.

"State" and "Private" refer to majority

ownership, while the disaggregated private groups ("Foreign," "Domestic," MEBO" and
"Mass") categorize firms according to their largest private owner type.

Firm-year

observations when the state was majority owner experienced a productivity decline (-.024

26 Smith et al (1997) use contemporaneous financial indicators (exports, sales, profits, wage bonus and
debts) to instrument employee and foreign ownership in TFP regressions. Anderson et al (2000) exploit
details of the privatization process to instrument ownership in Mongolia, and Earle (1998) instruments
ownership with privatization method and other variables in Russia. None of these studies uses group or
fixed effects.
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at the mean), while privately owned firms increased on average (.012); the difference is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Turning to the disaggregated private categories, both MEBO- and mass-owned
firms experience average productivity declines (-.007 and -.014), and the difference from
state-owned firms is not statistically significant. Firms in years when the dominant
owner was a domestic or foreign blockholder, however, increased log labor productivity
significantly (.118 and .178, respectively), and the differences relative to state ownership
are highly significant.
Insert Table 14 about here.
These descriptive statistics take no account, however, of possible omitted variable
and selection biases in estimating the performance-ownership relationship.

Before

turning to the regression estimates, in which other factors are included as controls, it is
useful to look for evidence of selection bias, which may arise, for instance if inherently
more efficient firms are privatized more easily and have a higher probability of obtaining
active owners (such as concentrated external investors). A first test of the possible
selection bias is reported in Table 15, where we compute the pre-privatization
productivity growth rates for firms that are subsequently privatized, and compare them
with the growth rate for firms never privatized (within our observation period). The first
column of the table contains the average annual productivity growth for firms which
never became majority private, while the other columns refer to firm-years previous to
becoming majority private, or previous to becoming dominated by a particular type of
owner (using the same categories and definitions as in Table 14). The mean growth rates
lie in a narrow range (-.032 to .008), and the t-test of the difference in the means (relative
to the category of never majority private) is in no case significant. The small differences
in the means for firms that subsequently become foreign or domestic-investor owned are
particularly striking compared with the differences in their post-privatization
performance reported in Table 14. This crude test reveals no evidence of selection bias in
the privatization process.
Insert Table 15 about here.
Next we turn to the regression results, which control for third factors that may
influence both firm performance and ownership.
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Table 16 contains estimates of

Equations (2) and (3). Each type of private shareholding is estimated to have positive
and significant effects, with the foreign and domestic blockholder share coefficients
ranging from .274 to .423. The estimations do not provide a consistent ranking of
domestic and foreign investors, as the OLS estimation produces a larger impact of foreign
ownership, the fixed-effects specification a larger impact of domestic ownership, and the
median regression approximately equal impacts of foreign and domestic ownership.
Insert Table 16 about here.
Both types of blockholders display distinctly better performance than do MEBOs
and mass participants, but it is noteworthy that the shares of the latter two owner-types
nonetheless always have positive and significant coefficients at the 1-percent level, with
the range of estimates falling between .108 and .190. The difference in the estimated
effects of these two types is not large, and their relative ranking varies across
specifications: in the OLS and fixed effects the coefficient oiMassShare is larger, while
in the LAD regression MEBOShare has a larger coefficient. POFShare and OtherShare
also have positive, significant estimated coefficients.

*y*j

Table 17 reports the results of the models in which ownership is specified as a
categorical variable and in which we also include group effects, as discussed in Section 4.
The Equation (4) estimates show positive group effects for foreign and MEBO
privatizations, suggesting that firms with higher pre-privatization productivity growth
rates are more likely to be privatized by these methods (both ForeignEver and
MEBOEver have positive, significant estimated coefficients in both regression models),
while the OLS model (but not the LAD) produces some evidence of slightly higher preprivatization productivity growth in DomesticEver,

Similar to the results for share

ownership, we find that foreign and domestic blockholders have the largest impacts,
relative to their pre-privatization performance, while the effects of MEBO and mass
participants are smaller but still positive.

Among the identified owner-types,

27 Out of the 18 firms in which "others" were the majority owners (see Table 1), we were able to obtain
some additional information on seven that were listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange or Rasdaq, the
over-the-counter market. Three of them had large outside blockholders, one of which was foreign, one had
several smaller outsiders and three had the insiders' organization as the dominant owner. The presence of
outside owners may be the reason that this ownership has large, positive and significant estimated
coefficients.
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ForeignDummy and DomesticDummy have the largest coefficients, and MEBODummy

and MassDummy coefficients are smaller, while all are highly statistically significant.

"7ft

Insert Table 17 about here.
Thus, the evidence from the dummy variable models is quite consistent with that
from the share ownership models: privatization to external investors, whether foreign or
domestic, is associated with higher labor productivity growth than privatization to
MEBOs or mass program participants; all forms of privatization appear to dominate
continued state ownership. While our analysis has shown that these results are robust
across a variety of specifications of the estimating equations, a possible objection to the
large estimated impact of outside investor ownership is that the sample of observations
on this group of firms is relatively small and tends to be concentrated towards the end of
the sample period, as we showed in Table 3. But the number of observations is still
sufficient to derive meaningful estimates:

395 firm-years for firms dominated by

domestic investors, and 128 dominated by foreigners. Of these, 219 of the domesticdominated firms are for the year 1998 and 176 beforehand, while 77 foreign-dominated
observations are for the year 1998 and the other 51 beforehand. 29
How do our results relate to the findings of other studies? First of all, it should be
pointed out that there are almost no comparable studies for Romania. The only other
econometric analysis of the effect of privatization in Romania is included in Claessens,
Djankov and Pohl's (1997) study of seven transitional countries. For their Romanian
subsample, they estimate a positive effect on total factor productivity growth of a dummy
for whether a firm was privatized. Their observation period runs only through 1995, by
which time little privatization had occurred, however, and they are not able to distinguish
different types of private ownership, nor the levels of shareholdings.

28 Estimating Equation (7) with firm fixed effects resulted in a somewhat higher MEBO dummy coefficient
(.101), but only trivial differences for the foreign, domestic and mass dummy coefficients relative to Table
10. OtherDummy has the largest estimated impact in both the fixed effects and group effects specifications
estimated with OLS (although not with LAD), possibly because of the outside investor ownership discussed
in footnote 31.
29 To check whether our results are affected by the relatively short period for the firms privatized through
these means in 1998, we re-estimated equations (6) and (7) dropping these firms from the sample, thus
including only firms with at least two years of observations under their new ownership structure. This
exercise produced results that were qualitatively similar to those in Table 9 and 10, although standard errors
were slightly higher.
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Indeed there are few comparable studies for other transition economies, as most
research in this area has been undertaken with small samples of firms observed only
shortly after their privatization process began.

Among such studies, Earle (1998)

estimates labor productivity equations for about 150 Russian enterprises, finding a
positive coefficient on private share ownership; when types of private ownership are
disaggregated, OLS regressions show a larger impact of managerial than other types of
ownership, but in instrumental variable specifications concentrated outside owners have
the biggest impact, consistent with the results shown here. Smith, Cin and Vodopivec
(1997) analyze the effect of privatization to employees and foreign investors in Slovenia,
finding positive impacts of both on the contemporaneous level of total factor
productivity, but the data cover only the very early years from 1989 to 1992 and the
regression sample includes very few observations on foreign ownership, Weiss and
Nikitin (1998) find a positive impact of ownership by non-fund blockholders on a
number of performance indicators, including labor productivity, using data through 1996
on a sample of 697 Czech firms, although they do not estimate the impact of voucher
privatization per se. Anderson et al (2000) is somewhat unusual in finding little effect of
privatization in a study of about 150 mass-privatized firms in Mongolia, although again
the time span is short (running only through 1995). A final example, Frydman et al's
(1999) analysis of around 200 firms in Central Europe, estimates an impact on
productivity growth of .043 for a dummy variable representing private ownership and
.164 for private domestic financial firms, although neither foreign investors nor private
domestic nonfinancial firms have statistically significant effects. Their data run only
through 1993, however, making it difficult to draw strong conclusions.

6. Conclusion

The debates over how privatization affects firm performance, which privatization
method works best, and which type of owner is the most suited for carrying out
restructuring, have been long and heated. Yet there have been remarkably few studies
that have analyzed the privatization-performance relationship using panel data from a
large sample of firms containing information for periods both before and after
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privatization. Indeed, given that privatization policies are typically so prominent and
controversial, we know remarkably little about their outcomes in the transition
economies: there are few studies for any country of Central and Eastern Europe that
provide a comprehensive description of the post-privatization ownership structure and its
consequences for firm behavior.
In this paper, we have focussed on a particular form of privatization management-employee buyout - and we have argued that Romania offers an interesting
ground for research for three reasons: First, it has been possible to construct a data set
containing high quality and nearly complete information on the privatization process for
corporatized industrial enterprises. Second, MEBO privatization was widespread and it
involved some interesting institutional set-ups that repay investigation. Third, although
MEBOs have dominated overall, variants of the other major types of privatization
policies are also represented, resulting not only in firms dominated by employees, but
also others with significant stakes held by dispersed outsiders, domestic blockholders,
foreign blockholders and the state.
Our analysis of the effects of Romania's privatization policies on industrial
enterprises had three components: the ownership structure resulting from privatization,
the corporate governance characteristics of privatized firms, and the association of
ownership structure with enterprise productivity performance.

Our analysis of the

ownership results showed that the state retains a dominant role in many Romanian firms:
in more than three-quarters, the SOF retained some ownership stake, and the average
stake was 46.9 percent within this group. A scant majority (53.8 percent) of the firms
originally slated for privatization in 1992 had become majority private by 1998. The
most prevalent types of new private owners were employees (23.6 percent on average),
buying out their firms through MEBOS, and participants of the Mass Privatization
Program (18.2 percent on average). Concentrated outsiders - domestic and foreign were present in only 476 (20 percent) of the companies, but the average in this group of
firms was a majority stake.
Our discussion of the privatization methods and their ownership outcomes
highlighted possible corporate governance problems that might have reduced the
potential benefits of all methods of privatization in Romania. While it seems plausible
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that sales to outside blockholders would be most likely to raise firm efficiency, we have
argued that even these investors may be handicapped by contractual restrictions and other
impediments to restructuring posed by Romanian policies and the business environment.
Concerning MEBOs, our analysis suggests that the impact of employee ownership,
relative to continued state ownership, may be reduced by the continued role of the state
and certain aspects of the institutional design of the MEBO privatization process.
Finally, the highly dispersed ownership structure resulting from the mass privatization
suggests that MPP participants may be unlikely to contribute much to corporate
governance, although secondary transactions might have created some concentration
(which we unfortunately cannot observe).
Despite the corporate governance problems resulting from peculiarities of the
privatization policy design, our empirical findings provide substantial evidence that
MEBO privatization, as well as the other methods, has had a positive and substantial
effect on the growth of labor productivity in Romania. As we have shown, the statistical
significance of these effects remain robust across alternative specifications, although the
point estimates do fluctuate depending on the estimation method employed. Our work
strongly supports the proposition that outsider blockholders are the most effective
owners, and that among them, there is some tendency for foreigners to have the largest
positive impact on the firms. The estimated regression coefficients on disaggregated
outsider owners (MPP participants) and on MEBO participants are also positive and
statistically significant, although the point estimates are distinctly smaller than those of
the outside blockholders.

Thus the data provide evidence that even MEBOs and

dispersed outside owners have a positive impact, relative to continued state ownership.
Why we find that the MEBO and MPP privatizations may have yielded improved
performance is a subject on which our data permits us only to speculate, but we shall do
so nevertheless. First, we should recall that our ownership measures pertain only to the
privatization transactions, and we do not observe subsequent secondary sales of shares.
Perhaps the employees and other individuals acquiring small quantities of shares through
these programs were quick to sell them, and possibly some concentrated owners outsiders or managers - have emerged and begun restructuring, although we are unable to
observe this process. According to our analysis of survey data in Section 3, the evolution
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of ownership in MEBO firms has been slow, probably due at least in part to institutional
restrictions on share trading, but it may still have been somewhat effective. Second,
share prices on secondary sales, particularly in an organized exchange - either the
Bucharest Stock Exchange or the over-the-counter RASDAQ could possibly provide
additional information to outside blockholders on firm performance, suggesting some
complementarity between outside blockholder ownership with dispersed investor trading.
Third, perhaps the individuals acquiring shares through the MPP were in fact employees,
adding to the concentration of ownership in the MEBO-privatized companies. Fourth,
there may be selection bias such that firms with better potential were included in the
MEBOs and MPP, as discussed in Section 5 above. Finally, the data may contain
measurement error in either labor productivity or (less likely) in the ownership structure
variables, creating a spurious correlation. Such measurement error would have to be
biased such that MEBO and MPP firms have upward-biased productivity measures, as
uncorrelated measurement error would produce simply larger standard errors (for
measurement error in productivity) or downward bias in the coefficients (for
measurement error in ownership).
In closing, the evidence suggests that privatization through MEBO, despite a
number of institutional peculiarities and continued involvement by the state, has been
successful in raising productivity growth. While the results also imply that sales to
outside investors - whether domestic or foreign - have produced still much better
performance, the MEBO privatizations appear to have been much easier to accomplish,
particularly for a country so devoid of market institutions and skills, such as Romania in
the early 1990s. Perhaps the later investor sales built on a base of privatization through
MEBO that would have otherwise been difficult to achieve. Although we cannot say
with assurance whether the block sales program would have been able to get off the
ground if it were not for the earlier MEBOs, it does seem safe to say that, at least in
Romania, privatization to employees did play a useful role in the transition process.
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Appendix A: Construction of the Database
Al. Construction of Ownership Time Series
Our analysis is based on unpublished data from multiple sources that we have
linked together. The information on the ownership of the initially state-owned joint-stock
companies is compiled from seven databases: the SOF (State Ownership Fund)
Transactions Database, the SOF Portfolio Database,30 and one database for each of the
five POFs. Table 13 lists the databases, the types of the company they have information
on, and the relevant variables for our analysis.
Insert Table 13 about here.
From these sources, we were able to construct a nearly complete evolution of the
ownership of all initially state-owned enterprises (except companies excluded from the
SOF portfolio, most notably the regii autonome, which were not originally slated for
privatization). Incomplete information in these files, however, forced us to make a
number of assumptions, especially about the date of privatization and about holdings of
the POFs, as we discuss below. We should also point out that the SOF has been
responsible for privatizing the shares only of joint-stock ("commercial11) companies, thus
excluding spin-offs of shops or assets from the parent companies. In this appendix, we
report the construction of ownership time-series, our imputations when information was
incomplete, and cleaning procedures.
Our starting-point in developing the ownership time-series is a data set from the
SOF that we call the "Transactions Database." For all share sale transactions carried out
by the SOF, this file contains the date, percentage transferred and type of buyer. Four
types of buyers can be distinguished in these data: employee association, domestic
individuals, domestic institutions, and foreigners. The employee association is the legal
group of employees acquiring shares in a MEBO transaction, while the other three types
can be assumed to be non-employee outsiders.31
This database does not contain, however, companies that had no sales transaction
at all. Among such companies are those still 100 percent state-owned, and those
privatized only through the Mass Privatization Program. We added these companies
from a second SOF source: the "Portfolio Database." This database does not report
information on the date of transaction, but this did not present any difficulty in the case of
MPP privatization, because all the MPP transfers took place in 1996. The database has
additional information on shares transferred directly to managers and "others," which we
describe below. After matching the companies with sales transactions with the totally
state-owned and the MPP firms, we obtained 8,988 companies, the total number of
initially state-owned companies.
The Transactions Database also does not provide information on the status of
shares initially transferred to the POFs, 30 percent in each converted joint-stock
30 Together, they provide information on the ownership structure of over 8,900 companies, all initially
state-owned firms which were in the SOF's portfolio. (Regii autonome are not included, because they
belonged to the branch ministry and later a number of them were transferred to the local authorities, but the
SOF never had them in its portfolio).
The data do not allow further disaggregation; for instance, different types of domestic institutions are not
distinguishable.
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company. Although they have been putatively private since their formation in 1991, we
believe it is important to distinguish the POFs from other types of owners, thus the next
step in the construction of the time series was to estimate the sales of shares by these
organizations. A first step relied on a variable from the portfolio database: the
percentage of shares sold by the POFs from 1992 to 1996, before these organizations
were transformed into SEFs, as we discuss in Section 2. 32 The number of companies
where the POP is reported to have sales is relatively small, 1633. We cleaned the
variable first, because there were companies in which the POP is reported to have sold
more than 30 percent, which is impossible according to the Romanian privatization laws.
If the POP sale was above 35 percent (14 cases), we set the POP sale to zero, while if it
was between 30-35 percent (11 cases), we set it to 30 percent, the maximum amount the
POP could have owned.
Because the data did not include the transaction date of POP sales, nor the type of
buyer, we had to make several assumptions in order to include them in the time-series.
First, we assumed that the POP always sold at the same time and to the same buyer as the
SOF. Thus, if there were any sales reported in the SOF database between 1992-1996, the
POP sales were included there. If the SOF privatized shares of a company on more than
one date, or to multiple buyers, the percentage of the shares the POP sold was split
among the SOF sales, weighted by the shares transferred by the SOF in each sale. For
the majority of firms with POP sales during 1992-96, the SOF also privatized: 87 percent
of the firms where the POP did some privatization had also SOF sales. For the firms that
did not have SOF sales (212 firms), we distributed the POP sales evenly among the years
1993-1996, and assumed it was bought up by "others," an ownership category where we
included all transactions for which the type of buyer was neither reported nor possible to
impute.33 By this procedure, we computed the POF's ownership for the end 1992-1996
by subtracting the total yearly privatization from 30, the percentage of the shares that the
POP received initially.
We also estimated the ownership time-series for the SIP holdings (Financial
Investment Funds, the organizations into which the POFs were transformed after 1996).34
We took this information from five portfolio databases (one for each POP). These data
were available only for the end of 1998, except in the case of POP Moldova, for which it
was provided also for the end of 1997.35 We combined these information with the POP
holdings in 1996, which we already used for the construction of the POP time series
before 1996.
We computed the POP holdings in the following way: for the POP holdings in
1996 we used the POP information, and for the few cases when this variable was missing
(0.3 percent of total), we made the 1996 POP holding equal with the POP holding which
was the closest in time (1997 for POP Moldova, 1998 for the others). For the four POFs
which did not have information for 1997, we imputed it by comparing the holdings in
32 Not only is this information on the POP privatization rather incomplete, but the variable itself is
incomplete, according to a SOF official.
33 We did not distribute the POP sales over 1992, because in this year privatization hardly began: except of
pilot privatizations (21 firms) and one other took place.
34 Por simplicity, we continue to call them POFs.
35 Out of the 2825 firms that existed in the POP portfolio data, 179 were not in the SOF database. These
may be acquisitions of the POFs other than state-owned companies. We did not add these companies to the
time-series.

35

1996 with those in 1998. If there was no difference between them, the case for 83.0
percent of the companies, we computed the 1997 POP holding as being equal to these
holdings. If there was a difference, we computed the POP holding for 1997 as the
average of 1996 and 1998 holdings, and we added the difference to the "others" category,
where we included all transactions where we did not know the type of owner.
The Portfolio Database contains two more variables representing two types of
transactions: managerial shares and "others," as mentioned above. The managerial shares
resulted from the Law on the Management Contract (66/93), issued in the second part of
1993, and concern only 400 companies with a mean of only 0.5 percent in this subset, hi
the absence of further information, we therefore distributed these shares evenly over the
years 1994-1998, and summed it with the employee association shares to the MEBOs'
share. The "others" variable is positive for 227 companies with a mean of 25.6 percent.
According to a SOP official, this variable probably indicates capital increases after
privatization, but there is no information on which type of owner acquired these shares.
Thus, we cumulated them together with the several types of unknown owners to create a
miscellaneous and unknown category, distributing them evenly over 1993-1998.
Due to internal inconsistencies, for a number of cases the sum of the total
privatization and the POP holdings by end 1998 exceeded 100 percent. If it was more
than 110, we dropped the case (222 companies). If it was between 100-110, we rescaled
it to 100. The residual category is state ownership.
A2. Construction of the Performance Variable and Final Sample
We drew the basic firm variables (activity code, number of employees and real
value of sales36) from the 1992-1999 Romanian Enterprise Registries, which is supposed
to contain all registered firms. We built up our database from eight different files, one for
each year. Our version of these data are restricted to firms with a minimum of five
employees. After adding employment and sales figures to the ownership information, we
constructed our final sample by selecting all industrial firms (2354 cases).
Table 14 shows the resulting database, combining the ownership and registry
information. The "percentage of firms" refers to the firms with non-missing performance
data as a percentage of those with ownership information. Missing values are not a large
problem in these data. Table 15 shows the distribution of firms by industrial branch: the
largest categories are food industry (21.5 percent), textiles and clothing (14.4 percent)
and machine building and transportation equipment (12.9 percent).
Insert Table 14-15 about here.

Appendix B: Description of the Sample Used in Section 3
The sample of firms analyzed in Section 3 was drawn from a list of all firms
privatized by MEBO until March 4, 1994. Of 360 companies on the list, 101 were
interviewed in 1995 and early 1996, 28 percent of the total. Sample choice strove for
We deflated sales by 4-digit level PPIs, when these were available: out of a total of 367 industrial 4digit activity codes, 75 are missing for 1993-98. The number of missing PPIs for 1999 is 91. These were
replaced by 2-digit CAEN codes. For two types of activities the PPIs were not computed: calculator
production (since 1997), and recycling (for all years). In these two cases we used the industry-level PPL
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representativeness along the dimensions of region, industry and size. In 1998, a followup survey was carried out to update the information from these firms. The sample
follow-up decreased to 72 because of non-responses and liquidations.
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Tables

Table 1: Post-Privatization Ownership Structure, End-1998
(percent ownership conditional on a non-zero share in the firm)
Mean
Median Number of Number of firms
Type of Owner ownership ownership firms with with majority
(percent) (percent) owner-type
ownership
Foreign
56.6
51.0
98
72
Domestic
52.7
378
42.3
173
MEBO
64.9
70.6
858
519
Mass
24.5
1747
18.4
296
Other
10.4
693
1.2
18
POP
20.1
941
18.6
32
State
1822
46.9
50.9
935
Total number of firms: 2354
Notes: MEBO = employees who obtained shares through Management-Employee
Buyouts, Mass = individuals who obtained shares within the Mass Privatization Program,
Other = owners not classifiable with available information.

Table 2: Evolution of the Ownership Structure
(average percent at year-end)
Type of Owner
1992 1993
1995
1994
1996
Foreign
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.2
Domestic
0.0
0.6
0.4
0.0
2.3
MEBO
0.2
17.5
3.0
21.3
9.6
Mass
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18.2
Other
0.0
1.2
0.8
0.4
1.3
Total private
0.4
19.6
43.4
11.0
3.6
POP
29.8 28.7
23.9
26.4
9.1
State
69.7 67.7
56.5
62.6
47.5
N.B. Percentage of
0.4
18.4
3.3
10.3
38.7
firms majority private*

1997
0.9
4.1
22.1
18.2
2.1
47.3
8.7
44.0

1998
2.4
8.5
23.6
18.2
3.1
55.7
8.0
36.3

43.8

53.8

Number of firms: 2354
Notes: MEBO = employees who obtained shares through Management-Employee Buyouts,
Mass = individuals who obtained shares within the Mass Privatization Program, Other = owners
not classifiable with available information.
*Percentage of firms with more than 50 percent of shares privately owned
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Table 3: Distribution of Firms by Largest Owner-Type
(percent of firms at year-end)
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
Type of Owner
1.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
Foreign
0.1
0.1
2.1
3.9
0.8
0.5
Domestic
0.1
0.1
21.5
22.3
17.4
9.7
MEBO
0.2
3.0
14.0
13.5
0.0
0.0
Mass
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.2
0.0
0.0
Other
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.0
POF
0.0
0.0
62.3
58.0
81.6
89.7
99.6
State
96.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
100.0

1998
3.3
9.3
24.5
14.2
1.0
0.2
47.6
100.0

Number of firms: 2354
Notes: MEBO = employees who obtained shares through Management-Employee Buyouts, Mass =
individuals who obtained shares within the Mass Privatization Program, Other = owners not
classifiable with available information.

Table 4: Ownership Structure, 1995
Mean Std. Min. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Max.
Type of owner
dev.
94.8 10.8 50.5 85.4 95.6 99.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
INSIDERS, of which
7.5 13.1 26.2 45 .0 59.5 81.4
30.9 20. 8 2.0
Managers
62.7 22. 1 8.9 33.3 45.8 64.6 82 .0 91.2 98.0
Non-man, empl.
7.5 13.8 21.6 38 .0 54.0 89.5
Non-prod, w.
27.8 20..0 2.6
4.6 18.0 33.7 49 .4 68.0 92.0
Prod. w.
34.8 22. 7 0.0
2.0 15.9 29.7 46 .8 66.0 92.0
Skilled
31.9 22. 2 0.0
3 .0
1.0
0.0
7.3 45.0
0.0
Unskilled
2.9 6. 0 0.0
0 .0
0.0
0.0 56.9
0.0
0.0
1.2
PAS, not distributed
6. 9 0.0
4 .3 13.0 44.9
0.9
0.0
0.0
4.6
OUTSIDERS, of which
9. 4 0.0
6.8
2.7
0.0
0.0
1 .0
0.0
Retirees, former empl.
0.8
1. 5 0.0
3.8 13.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
Other former empl.
1.0 2. 5 0.0
7.0 42.0
0 .0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.8
Investors
8. 8 0.0
0.0 44.0
0 .0
0.0
0.0
0.0
STATE
0.6 4. 7 0.0
Number of firms: 91
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Table 5: Ownership Structure 1995, Conditional on Non-Zero Ownership
Type of owner
Mean Std. Min. P50 Max. No. of Perc. of
dev.
firms firms
INSIDERS, of which
94.8 10.8 50.5 99.3 100.0 91
100.0
Managers
30.8 20.8
81.4 91
2.0 26.2
100.0
Non-man, empl.
62.7 22.1
98.0 91
8.9 64.6
100.0
Non-prod, w.
27.8 20.0
89.5 91
2.6 21.6
100.0
Prod. w.
35.2 22.6
92.0 90
0.5 33.9
98.9
Skilled
33.0 21.7
92.0 88
0.5 31.0
96.7
Unskilled
4.4
7.0
45.0 59
0.1 2.0
64.8
PAS, not distributed
18.1 22.1
56.9
0.5 8.5
6
6.6
OUTSIDERS, of which
7.6 11.0
44.9 55
0.1 3.2
60.9
Retirees, former empl.
1.0
1.8
1.8
0.1
6.8 39
43.5
Other former empl.
3.5
3.9
13.0 24
0.3 2.9
27.2
Investors
12.9 15.0
42.0 20
0.5 6.0
22.8
STATE
27.0 24.0 10.0 27.0
44.0
2
2.2
SOF
44.0 na
44.0 44.0
44.0
1
1.1
POP
10.0 na
10.0 10.0
10.0
1
1.1
Number of firms: 91

Type of owner

Mean

TOTAL INSIDERS
Voted individually
Managers
Non-man, empl.
Non-prod, w.
Prod. w.
Skilled
Unskilled
Voted by the PAS
Managers
Non-man, empl.
Non-prod, w.
Prod. w.
Skilled
Unskilled

94.8
58.5
19.9
38.6
16.9
21.6
19.7
1.9
36.3
11.0
24.2
10.9
13.2
12.2
0.9

Table 6: Voting Rights of Insiders
Std. Min plO p25 p50 p75 p90 Max Perc., with
dev.
pos. own.
10.8 50.5 85.4 95.6 99.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0
43.5
0.0
0.0
0.0 76.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
71. 4
22.4
0.0
0.0
0.0 12.5 29.2 53.4 81.4
71.4
33.6
0.0
0.0
0.0 30.7 72.0 89.6 98.0
71.4
18.5
0.0
0.0
27.2 41.0 89.5
0.0 12
71.4
24.4
0.0
0.0
0.0 13.1 34.5 64.8 92.0
70. 3
23.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 12.3 31.5 56.5 92.0- 68. 5
4.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.5
5.0 35.0
47. 8
42.8
0.0 93.0 99.4 100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
45. 7
0.0
16.8
0.0
0.0 17.5 37.0 71.9
0.0
44. 6
31.4
0.0
0.0
0.0 45.8 82.0 94.4
0.0
44. 6
18.4
0.0
0.0
0.0 17.8 32.0 88.7
0.0
44. 6
20.5
0.0
0.0
0.0 26.0 44.0 81.0
0.0
43. 5
0.0
19.5
0.0
0.0 25.0 40.2 79.3
0.0
41. 3
2.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
1.8 19.1
26. 1

Number of firms: 91
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Table 7: Voting system of the PAS
Percent
Voting arrangement
__________________________of firms
One vote per member______________43.6
Votes according to the subscribed shares___56.4
Number of firms: 101
Table 8: Average Voting Rights
Mean Std. Min. plO
dev.
1.4 0.0 0.1
1.3
Employees, of which
0.0 0.7
7.2
6.3
Managers
0.0 0.1
1.1
0.9
Non-man, empl.
2.4 0.0 0.2
1.9
Non-prod, w.
0.0 0.1
0.8
Prod. w.
0.7
0.0 0.1
0.8
0.7
Skilled
0.0 0.0
0.4
0.5
Unskilled
0.0 0.1
1.1
1.0
Within PAS
0.6
4.0 4.0 0.1
Managers
0.9 0.0 0.1
0.8
Non-man, empl.
6.4 0.0 0.1
2.4
Non-prod, w.
0.0 0.1
0.8
0.6
Prod. w.
0.0 0.0
0.7
Skilled
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.5
Unskilled
0.0 0.0
3.3
1.5
Outsiders, of which
0.0 0.0
0.6
0.9
Retirees, former empl.
0.0 0.1
0.8
0.7
Other former empl.
0.2
0.1
5.5
9.5
Investors

within Types of Owners
p25 p50 p75 p90 Max. Perc. with
pos. own.
3.6
69.0
1.7
7.1
1.0
0.4
7.5 13.3 39.0
4.5
65.0
2.1
1.1
2.5
65.0
5.5
0.6
0.3
4.5 14.4
2.4
1.1
65.0
0.5
1.7
65.0
0.7
3.6
0.4
0.2
2.0
0.7
3.6
0.4
63.0
0.2
1.0
43.0
0.5
2.3
0.3
0.1
2.8
46.0
1.3
5.0
0.6
0.3
41.0
6.4 10.7 15.0
1.4 2,1
4.3
1.8
41.0
1.2
0,4
0.2
4.8 39.7
41.0
1.4
0.7
0.3
1.5
41.0
0.8
4.3
0.3
0.2
39.0
4.3
1.6
0.8
0,4
0.2
24.0
2.8
1.9
0.5
0.2
0.1
59.0
2.9
1.4
21.0
0.5
0.2
43.0
1.7
4.4
0.3
0.1
0.9
25.0
1.7
3.0
0.8
0,4
0.1
21.0
5.4 18.0 38.0
1.2
0.2

Note: Number of firms: 100. Voting rights per capita defined as the percentage of shares over the number of persons in
the ownership category.

Table 9: Aggregate Holding of Four Largest Holders, Managers and
Non-Managerial Employees
Type of owner Mean Std Min. PlO P25 P50 P75 P90 Max.
dev
0.0
5.C 10.C 21.C 45..0 62.3 84.0
28.1 22..1
Managers
3.C 5.C 8.6 14 .0 23.2 42.0
1.0
8..6
11.0
Non-man empl
Number of firms: 99
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Table 10: Length of Contractual Restrictions
Restriction
Mean Std. Min. Median Max. Percent of
Dev.
firms in 1998
Change in employment
2.1
1.4
0
2
8
7.6
Change in major activity 4.9
2.1
0
5
10
6.1
Sale of assets
5.5
1.9
0
6
10
6.6
Number of firms: 101. The length of restriction is measured in years. The last column shows
the percentage of the 66 firms in the 1998 sample that still had restrictions.

Type of owner

Mean

INSIDERS, of which
Managers
Non-man, empl.
OUTSIDERS, of which
Banks
SIF
Firms
Individuals
Foreigners
STATE

87.5
29.2
58.5
12.2
0.2
0.4
4.5
5.5
1.7
0.2

Table 11:
Std. Min
dev.
24.6
0.0
24.0
0.0
27.2
0.0
24.7
0.0
1.4
0.0
1.6
0.0
18.4
0.0
12.8
0.0
9.3
0.0
1.3
0.0

Ownership Structure in 1998
P10 P25 P50
P75
P90
48.0
2.8
20.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

85.3 100.0 100.0
7.5 20.0 50.8
39.0 60.0 84.3
0.0
0.0 14.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

100.0
65.0
93.0
52.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
23.0
0.0
0.0

Max Perc. with
pos. own.
100.0
98.6
98.0
95.7
97.6
97.1
100.0
33.3
1.4
11.8
7.2
9.0
100.0
8.7
57.3
20.3
73.0
5.8
5.8
10.0

Number of firms: 69. The last column shows the mean conditional on positive ownership.

Table 12: Degeneration of Employee Ownership,
1995 to 1998
1995
1998
Type of owner
Mean Std. Mean Std.
dev.
dev.
INSIDERS, of which
94.5
10.7 87.2 25.7
Managers
20.7 23.8 26.6 25.3
Non-managerial employees 37.6 33.5 42.1 32.5
PAS
36.1 43.9 18.6 36.9
Managers
11.7 17.9
2.8
10.3
Nonman. emp
23.3 30.8 16.0 32.7
OUTSIDERS, of which
5.4 10.2 12.6 25.8
STATE
0.2
1.3
0.2
1.3
Number of firms: 62
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Cond.
mean
88.8
30.5
60.3
36.7
11.8
5.4
51.6
29.0
29.6
3.8

Table 13: Summary Statistics for Employment, Real Sales
1994
1995
1993
1992
Mean
836.1
898.9
1154.3 1045.5
Employment
Std. Dev. 1778.0 1707.1 1587.2 1558.8
Mean
2072.1 2328.0 1864.1 1962.2
Real sales
Std. Dev. 5188.2 7931.6 7980.2 9096.5
1.87
1.69
Mean
2.01
2.07
Labor
productivity
2.47
2.38
Std. Dev.
2.75
2.87
0.28
-0.90
Mean
0.43
NA
Productivity
growth
2.30
Std. Dev.
0.62
4.22
NA
2050
Number of firms
2048
1924
1931

and Labor Productivity
1997
1996
1998
733.8
788.9
622.2
1908.7 1451.6 1266.8
1908.7 1750.6 1477.2
8481.6 9132.1 8413.3
1.73
1.89
1.71
2.32
2.39
2.69
-0.03
0.39
0.06
0.48
12.75
0.99
2129
2134
2108

1999
514.4
1083.8
1256.8
6310.0
1.86
2.49
0.24
1.16
2139

Notes: Real value of sales expressed in thousands of 1992 lei. Productivity growth expressed in proportions.
NA: not applicable.

Mean
(t-stat)
N

Table 14: Productivity Growth by Largest Owner
MEBO
Domestic
Foreign
Private
State
0.118**
0.178**
0.012**
-0.007
-0.024
(1.75)
(4.73)
(2.79)
(4.03)
13028
353
10857
113
3670

Mass
-0.014
(0.64)
11752

Notes: Firm-year observations. "State" and "Private" refer to majority ownership, while the
disaggregated private ownership categories refer to largest shareholding. Absolute value of tstatistics in parentheses test the difference of means of each private owner type relative to majority
state. Labor productivity growth is measured as the log of the ratio of labor productivity for year t to
that for year t-1. Ownership is measured at end of year t-1. ** = significant at 1 percent level.

Mean
(t-stat)
N

Table 15: Pre-Privatization Productivity Growth by Future Owner-Type
Mass
MEBO
Domestic
Foreign
Never majority
Private
private
after year t after year t after year t after year t after year t
-0.033
0.000
-0.013
0.008
-0.032
-0.012
(0.06)
(1.91)
(0.98)
(1.55)
(1.75)
929
966
812
4526
320
3207

Notes: Firm-year observations included only if state was largest owner in the given year. Absolute value of tstatistics in parentheses test the difference of means of each largest owner type relative to never majority private.
Labor productivity growth is measured as the log of the ratio of labor productivity for year t to that for year t-1.
Ownership is measured at end of year t-1.
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Table 16: Estimated Impact of Types of Owners on Productivity
Growth
Estimation method
Median
OLS
Fixed effects
Coeff.
Std.
Std.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Std.
Error
Error
Error
0.423** 0.101
0.274** 0.046
0.352** 0.072
ForeignShare
0.319** 0.048
0.276** 0.027
0.403** 0.040
DomesticShare
0.161**
0.114**
0.178** 0.021
MEBOShare
0.017
0.011
0.174**
0.108**
0.190**
MassShare
0.034
0.023
0.036
0.263** 0.074
0.179** 0.053
0.300** 0.106
OtherShare
0.167** 0.040
0.114** 0.030
0.264** 0.047
POFShare
E2
0.150
0.079
0.350
Number of observations : 14,532.
1? en fti>r OT Q
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median regression, R-sq within for fixed effects. Robust standard errors for OLS. All
regressions include controls for previous performance, employment size and year effects. OLS
and median regressions also include controls for region (6 categories) and industry (14
categories). ** = significant at 1 percent level.

Table 17: Estimated Impact of Largest Owner-Type on
Productivity Growth Using Group Effects
Estimation method
OLS
Median
Std.
Std.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Error
Error
0.083** 0.022
0.048** 0.020
ForeignEver
DomesticEver
0.032*
0.015 -0.003
0.013
0.062**
0.036**
MEBOEver
0.013
0.011
MassEver
0.000
0.001
0.014
0.012
OtherEver
0.040
0.083*
0.051
0.036
POFEver
0.040
0.052 0.060
0.073
0.191** 0.072
0.140** 0.040
ForeignDummy
0.157** 0.033
0.159** 0.024
DomesticDummy
0.055** 0.016
0.042** 0.014
MEBODummy
0.082** 0.021
0.060** 0.018
MassDummy
POFDummy
0.113
0.048
0.096
0.117
0.261**
OtherDummy
0.097
0.101
0.073
R2
0.451
0.079
Number of observations: 14,532.
Notes: Dependent variable = labor productivity growth. R2: R-sq for OLS,
pseudo R-sq for median regression, R-sq within for fixed effects. Robust
standard errors for OLS. All regressions include controls for previous
performance, employment size and year effects. OLS and median
regressions also include controls for region (6 categories) and industry (14
categories). ** = significant at 1 percent level. * = significant at 5 percent
level.
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Table 18: Sources of the Data
Relevant Variables
Companies in the Database
Database
of transaction
Date
SOF
the
that
sales
All
SOF Transactions
Database
completed since the beginning County
Percent of shares transacted
of its activity by 1999:1.
Book value of the firm
Method of privatization
Type of buyer________
SOF Portfolio
County
Surviving population of
Industry code
Database
companies in the SOF
Percent owned by the SOF
portfolio.
Percent sold by the POF by the end of the MPP
Percent owned by the POF after the MPP
Percent owned directly by managers
Percent owned by "others"
Percent distributed in the MPP
holding in December 1998
POF
POF Crisana-Banat Companies with POF holding
in December 1998.
POF holding in December 1997 and 1998
POF Moldova
Companies with POF holding
in 1997 and 1998.
POF holding in December 1998
POF Muntenia
Companies with POF holding
in 1998.
POF holding in December 1998
POF Oltenia
Companies with POF holding
in 1998.
POF holding in December 1998
POF Transilvania
Companies with POF holding
in 1998.
Romanian
County
All registered enterprises with
Enterprise Registry at least 5 employees at the end Industry
1992-1999 (one
Sales
of the given year.
Number of employees
database for each
year)
Note: firm ID included in all databases

Table 19: Number of Firms with Complete Ownership, Employment and Sales Data
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
Year
2168
2202
2074 2115 2134 2179 2183
1931
Number of firms
92.1
93.5
92.7
92.6
90.7
89.8
88.1
82.0
Percent of firms
Total number of firms: 2354
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Table 20. Distribution of Firms by Industry
Percent of firms
Industry
Number Percent
of firms of firms
Extraction, energy, water supply
131
5.6
21.6
Food
509
14.4
Textiles, clothing
338
Leather, footwear
53
2.2
108
4.6
Wood, paper
Polygraphy
76
3.2
Chemistry, plastics, rubber
159
6.8
Ceramics
151
6.4
Metallurgy
69
2.9
Metallic constructions
186
7.9
Machine building and transportation equip.
12.7
300
Electrical and optical equip.
83
3.5
Furniture and other unclassified
146
6.2
Recycling
45
1.9
Total
2354
100.0
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